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Cru:MINAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER RULE-APPLICATION TO THE JUSTIFIABLE 
KILLING OF AN AccoMPLICE BY THE INTENDED VICTIM-The defendant and 
an armed accomplice held up a grocery store, took money at gun point from 
the proprietor and fled in opposite directions. The proprietor pursued 
the accomplice and killed him in the gun battle that ensued. Defendant 
escaped, but later was apprehended and indicted on a charge of first de-
gree murder. On appeal from a judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer 
to the evidence, held, reversed and new trial ordered, three judges dissent-
ing. The defendant may be convicted of first degree murder under the 
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Pennsylvania statute which provides that "all murder ... which shall be 
committed in the perpetration of ... any ... robbery ... shall be murder 
in the first degree."1 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 
(2d) 204 (1955). 
Because of the varied treatment given the broad principle of felony-
murder by courts and legislatures through the years, the form and justifica-
tion of the rule have remained unsettled to this day. The general pattern 
up to now has been one of restricting its application.2 But the respon-
sibility of felons for homicides resulting from defensive measures of victims 
or their defenders has been affirmed in a series of recent decisions.3 The 
earlier case law proceeded on the assumption that participants in crime 
were liable only for acts actually or constructively performed by them. It 
was, therefore, impossible to attribute to those participants the activity of 
adverse parties.4 Pennsylvania was once among the jurisdictions accepting 
this principle.5 But at the same time the courts have recognized that the 
intervening activity of a human agent should not always insulate accused 
persons from criminal liability for homicide.6 When an innocent person 
is killed while being used as a "shield," the conviction seems to be based 
upon conduct which is so wanton and reckless that it overrides the finer 
points of causation.7 Neither the acts of insane persons nor the natural 
impulses of responsible human beings will necessarily break the chain of 
criminal causation. Theories more familiar to the law of torts are used to 
distinguish dependent from independent intervening causes, and causation 
is found to be proximate where the intervening causes are foreseeable.8 
By applying this test to cases involving felonies in which innocent parties 
were killed by the resistance of victims or their defenders, Pennsylvania 
some time ago opened up a new area for the operation of the felony-
murder doctrine.9 These cases were based on the theory that because 
resistance may be foreseen and would not have occurred but for the acts of 
the felons, they are criminally liable for its results. Other states have 
adopted this view,10 but there is no indication that those jurisdictions 
1 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4701. 
2 See, generally, Arent and MacDonald, "The Felony Murder Doctrine and its Appli-
cation under the New York Statutes," 20 CoRN. L.Q. 288 (1935); Perkins, "A Re-examina-
tion of Malice Aforethought," 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934). 
3 See 12 A.L.R. (2d) 210 (1950); 51 MICH. L. REv. 1241 (1953). 
4 Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v. Oxendine, 187 
N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924). 
5 Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 A. 97 (1936); Commonwealth v. 
Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534 (1928). 
6 State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 147 A. 118 (1929); Lettner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 299 
s.w. 1049 (1927). 
'l Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. App. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900); Wilson v. State, 188 
Ark. 846, 68 S.W. (2d) 100 (1934). 
8 See Cr.ARK AND MARsHALL, CRIMES, 5th ed., §236 (1952); 31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 659 (1933). 
9 Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. (2d) 595 (1949); Commonwealth v. 
Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. (2d) 736 (1947). 
10 People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W. (2d) 201 (1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 845, 
73 S.Ct. 62 (1952); Meirs v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. App. 572, 251 S.W. (2d) 404 (1952). 
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which formerly demanded actual or constructive performance of the act 
causing death will change their positions.11 In addition to the problem 
of imposing liability for the acts of innocent parties there is the related 
question of liability for the deaths of accomplices killed during the felony. 
Here, too, the authority is conflicting.12 On the basis of the proximate 
causation theory, the Pennsylvania court has recently taken the position 
that the role of the deceased in the crime is immaterial, so that now all 
participants in a felony are liable for any resulting death.13 The principal 
case marks the first invocation of this principle to convict a felon of the 
murder of an accomplice when his death was justifiably caused by an in-
tended victim. Justice Holmes contended that the felony-murder rule 
could be justified only on the ground that the degree of danger attending 
the commission of every felony is so high that those who engage in this 
activity will be liable for the homicides that result.14 If this is so, the fact 
that the victim of the homicide is a co-felon should not remove the case 
from the operation of the rule.15 Because he may be justifiably killed in 
self defense or in an effort to apprehend him, the felon's death is, in a way, 
the most likely to occur. By the same token, if the totality of dangers at-
tending the commission of the felony is the starting point, the acts of felons 
ought not to be distinguished from those of public defenders or victims. 
All are a foreseeable part of the danger surrounding the crime.16 The 
use of the doctrine of proximate causation to link the criminal with 
homicides committed by others may be viewed as a more articulate attempt 
to equate liability with the probable state of mind of the accused, and so 
arrive at the intent that for legal purposes is the foundation of implied 
malice. The ironical result of all this is that we try for murder the person 
who, next to the deceased himself, probably wanted least to see this 
homicide come about. Pennsylvania has chosen to follow this logic to what 
seems to be the bitter end. That it is the only reasonable conclusion it 
could reach in view of its past decisions may do no more than point up the 
weaknesses of the felony-murder rule. Originally evolved as a method of 
implying malice, the rule now threatens to incorporate a principle of causa-
11 The question of whose act must cause death in a felony-murder case may be 
answered by statute. A New York statute [39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §1044] 
requiring that the killing be committed by a person engaged in or attempting a felony has 
been interpreted to require at least constructive performance by an accused of the act 
causing death. People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930). However, the reason-
ing used in the principal case could lead to a different result. 
12 Finding felony-murder where one accomplice shot another: People v. Cabaltero, 31 
Cal. App. (2d) 52, 87 P. (2d) 364 (1939). Acquitting a conspirator not present at the 
scene of an arson in which an arsonist was burned to death: People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 
587,265 P. 230 (1928). 
13 Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. (2d) 464 (1955). 
14 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881). 
15 People v. Cabaltero, note 12 supra. But see Justice Musmano's dissenting opinion 
in the principal case at 221. 
16 But see Justice Jones' dissenting opinion in the principal case at 213. 
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tion of such universal and questionable application as to suggest that the 
time is ripe for a basic reappraisal of its scope and worth. , 
Frank M. Lacey 
1 Section 4 of the act provides that no possibility of reverter or right of entry, 
whether created before or after passage of the act, shall be good for more than fifty years. 
Section 5 provides that if the limiting contingency has occurred in any possibilities of 
reverter created more than fifty years prior to passage of the act, an action for recovery 
of the land must be brought within one year of the act's passage. ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) 
c. 30, §§37e and 37f. 
2 Clark, "Limiting Land Restrictions," 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1931); Cook, "Rights of Entry, 
Possibilities of Reverter, Resulting Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 15 TEMP. 
L.Q. 509 (1941). 
s Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the 
Use of Land," 54 HARV. L. REv. 248 (1940); SCURLOCK, R.ETROACTIVE LEGISLATION A:FFEcr-
ING INTERESTS IN LAND 236 (1953). 
4 The Massachusetts, Michigan, and. Minnesota statutes are representative of the 
legislation presently in existence. All operate prospectively. Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 
184, §22; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46; Minn. Stat. (1953) §500.20. 
5 E.g.: Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 3 P. (2d) 545 (1931); Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 
147 s. 862 (1933). 
6 These include provisions that land be used for church purposes, First Universalist 
Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892), that liquor not be sold on the prop• 
erty, Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879), and, of course, the normal building and 
use restrictions ordinarily provided for by covenants. 
